1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF 16 SW China AFIC
Tibetans
Chung-chia

languages, and that migration from other parts of China to Sikang is encouraged, seems to indicate that more labor force is needed before the ula system can be abolished in practice.[18] 563

The Tibetans in Sikang are Lamaists, upon whom Han Chinese culture has made little impression. Instead, they look to Tibet for cultural leadership. Relations between the Chinese and the Tibetans in Sikang have not been cordial, and the attitude of the Tibetans in Sikang toward Pekings seem to be contingent upon Peking's relation with Tibet proper. So far, the Communist government in Peking has had more administrative control over Sikang than over Tibet; this could be the reason behind the recent Communist move to unite the western part of Sikang province with Tibet proper,[19] hoping that, through Sikang, Tibet might be brought closer to Peking administratively and, through Tibet's cultural influence, Sikang's Tibetans might be made to co-operate with the Chinese government more readily. 563 648

E. The Pu-yi of Kweichow

Although called by different names in various parts of Kweichow, the Pu-yi are not divided into tribes like the Miao. Pu-yi dialects differ in individual localities, but not enough to become mutually unintelligible as is the case with the Miao dialects. The Pu-yi are a homogenous group, and there is little divergence between Pu-yi and Han Chinese cultures. The latter fact has made the Pu-yi more 563

18. People's Daily, Peking, Oct. 18, 1952; December 11, 1950.

19. Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao [New China Monthly], April 1955, pp. 15-16.

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Annex "A," Subparagraph 1k,
Sociological Background

RELIGION

I. INTRODUCTION

771 Religious organization and activity in China has always been strictly limited by what the state felt to be desirable. Public and private morality were not based on any religion but on a combination of philosophic principles (Confucianism) and secular mores. (On this principle, Confucianism is treated in the chapters on Social Values and Patterns of living.) Governmental authority judged whether a certain religion was conducive to morality and the welfare of the state and then allowed the religion and its adherents a carefully defined range and sphere of activity. Anything beyond that range was regarded as subversive of public welfare and morality, and the religion was curbed or suppressed. As a consequence China has not had, until very recently, any "churches," that is well-organized, centrally disciplined organizations of believers capable of decisively influencing public morality or state policy.

[178] With the slow collapse of the traditional order the effectiveness of government control of religion diminished. The Western powers, 771 as they gained more and more rights and conces- 148 sions from a weakening China, demanded and

got "rights" of religious and missionary activity which no strong Chinese government would ever have granted. But the rise of nationalist sentiment brought with it hatred of foreigners and of their religions -- hatred that exploded repeatedly in anti-foreign, anti-Christian riots.[1]

Meanwhile another trend was visible. Religious groups and a number of outstanding political leaders began to feel that China could not become truly modern and western unless it was reformed from the moral base upward; religion accounted for the power and success of Western nations. Would not a religion -- a religioned Confucianism, a revitalized Buddhism, or even Christianity -- bring about that basic transformation that China clearly needed?

This view was rejected by two overlapping groups which had decisive power in state and society after 1925. The first were the intellectual leaders, increasingly committed to some form of materialistic philosophy -- a philosophy which held all religion to be parasitic, corrosive

1. Tatsuro and Sumiko Yamamoto, "The Anti-Christian Movement in China," Far Eastern Quarterly, Feb. 1953, pp. 133-47.

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779 The situation in 1945-46 was encouraging
797 to Chinese and foreign Catholics. The clergy was being rapidly Sinicized, charitable work was going forward, Catholic educational institutions were full. Native and foreign clergy had gained approval for their work in the war of resistance against Japan. At the same time there were developments which, especially in the light of later events, promised
• [648] trouble to the Church. The exchange of envoys between the Vatican and the Nationalist Government took place in 1946; that Bishop Paul Yu-pin was widely believed to have strong influence with the Nationalist Government, boded ill for the Church when the government declined in power. As the Communist power increased,
668 the persecution of the Church, begun in Com-
798 munist area in 1937, was a grim warning of
797 what might be in store for Chinese Catholicism
779 as a whole.[61] Catholic Action, the association of enthusiastic laymen for the advancement of the Faith, had been growing in all parts of the country from 1928 onward; there were

61. Cf. Raymonde de Jaegher and I. Corbally Kuhn, Tempête sur la Chine, Paris, 1953.

565 of these benefits are limited and there have been
184 only a small number of beneficiaries.

565 On the liability side of the Communist policy
466 toward the worker are: the lack of substantial
184 increase in the standard of living, a harsher work schedule and loss of leisure time, and growing disillusionment as it becomes obvious that the "proletariat" has not really become the master of the New China. The recent let-up in "labor emulation" drives and the sudden flurry of official warnings against overwork and overly rigid demands upon the time and temper of the laborer indicate that the laboring class is not necessarily most productive under pressure. In addition, the worker's attitude may also be greatly influenced by the rise of a new, Communist-fostered managerial class, which, for whatever reasons, receives more benefits than does manual labor.

565 Foreign advisers had been employed in many
648 Chinese factories in pre-Communist days, and many workers may have become accustomed to recognizing the general excellence of Western technology. However, any government effort to impose foreign leadership in technical fields may injure the pride of the worker and provoke his resentment. There is no evidence to suggest that many Russian technicians or advisers are employed in factories in this region, or that those employed have caused resentment among the native workers.

2: Rock K-5 (1934-) 1947 AF16 Southwest China AF16

of the victors passing by the different roads of Ho-ch'ing and Li-chiang, broke through Shih-men Kuan 石門關 (Stone gate Pass).[47]

In the same year the magistracy of the fu-city of Li-chiang was established, and as A-te 阿得 was the first to submit to the conquerors he was appointed magistrate and was given the surname Mu 木.[48] Pei-sheng fu 北勝府, the present-day Yung-sheng 永勝 (Yung-pei), was demoted to a chou-city 州, and Yung-ning, Lang-ch'ü 浪穹, Lan chou and Shun chou 順州 were placed under the fu city of Ho-ch'ing (south of Li-chiang, 80 li distant).

In the 17th year (1384), Lan chou was again brought under the control of Li-chiang fu; thus the latter controlled, in all, four chou-cities, the aforesaid Lan chou, T'ung-an 通安, Chü-chin 巨津, and Pao-shan 寶山, also one magistracy or hsien city, namely Lin-hsi.

In the 31st year of Hung-wu (1398), Li-chiang fu's name was changed to Li-chiang Chün-min fu 麗江軍民府 (Military and civil government of Li-chiang).

Under the Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty. — In the 16th year of Shun-chih 順治 of the Ch'ing dynasty (1659), the territory of Yün-nan was annexed to the Chinese Empire. The magistracies of the four chou-cities of T'ung-an, Pao-shan, Lan chou and Chü-chin were abolished. Only one hsien-city, namely Lin-hsi, remained under the fu-city of Li-chiang.

In the first year of Yung-cheng (1723), A-chih-li 阿知立, A-chung-chü 阿仲琚, Ho Jih-chia 和日嘉 and A-pao-t'a 阿寶他[49] of the Mo-so tribe of Li-chiang city, went to the provincial capital and applied for the appointment of Chinese officials. Kao Ch'i-cho 高其倬, Viceroy of Yün-nan, and Yang Ming-shih 楊名時, the Hsün-fu 巡撫 (Provincial Governor), proposed to the Emperor that a transferable fu-magistrate be established in Li-chiang, and that the hereditary office of native fu-magistrate be demoted to that of T'u T'ung-p'an 土通判 (Native Sub-prefect).

Under the Republic. — To-day magistrates are still appointed by the Commissioner of the Interior, now called Min-cheng-t'ing 民政廳; the office of native sub-prefect still exists, but the present incumbent has neither voice nor power. He controls a few peasants on the land which he still possesses, but his holdings are being gradually reduced. Only recently his former peasants in the region of Nga-tz(u) became subject to the magistrate of Li-chiang and the territory included in the sixth ch'ü (sub-district) of Li-chiang. This sixth ch'ü comprises the northern part of the Yangtze loop, Nga-tz(u) being in Tung-shan li 東山里.

[47] The Shih-men Kuan is a strategic pass on the Yangtze where the river narrows considerably, the trail following the river at the foot of vertical cliffs. It is only a short distance north of Shih-ku 石鼓 where the Yangtze makes a sharp bend, some 85 li to the west of Li-chiang. (*See* Geographical description, p. 285.)

[48] He was the seventh generation of the Na-khi chiefs of Li-chiang. His full name was A-chia A-te 阿甲阿得, his official name being Mu Te 木得 (*see* the Historical Genealogies of the Na-khi Chiefs, pp. 99–101).

[49] Their Na-khi (Mo-so) names were: Aw-dshi-lêr, Aw-ndo-so and Aw-bpo-t'a. The Chinese characters are the transcription of the Na-khi sounds. The name Ho Jih-chia is one of Chinese adoption, and not a Na-khi name, save for the family name Ho, which every Na-khi peasant bore. The name A 阿 belonged to the ruling family.

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twelve "Panna," with some differences from the smaller t'u-ssu domains mentioned on the previous page. Only four are found in both lists, Liu-shun, Meng-lung, Meng-che, and Meng-a. The Sip Song Panna was to have formed part of the buffer state proposed in discussions by the French and British in 1895 but this was found impracticable, so that the last hope of an independent T'ai state here failed to materialize.[76]

Of the twelve subordinate states listed by Carey, Wu-tei and Meng-wu were annexed to French Indo-China. The chief towns of these two were Muang-u-nua and Muang-u-tai respectively, situated on the Nam U, a river which joins the Mekong just above Luang Prabang. Said Carey, in 1899, "The history of the 'Sip Song Panna' seems to have been a series of disputes about the succession; and desultory fighting for the supremacy was kept up for years, and until quite recently, between rival chieftains."[77]

Photo 14. Ching-kang, Yun-nan Province (21°46' N, 100° 14' E)

In this view are seen the mountain lands and basins of the southwestern Yun-nan frontier adjacent to Burma. The northward-looking view is from approximately above Ching-kang village, with the elongated river basins of Fu-hai (Meng-hai) in the middle distance. This area constitutes part of the recently established T'ai Autonomous Region organized by the Chinese Communists. Fu-hai has been a Han-Chinese administrative seat in southwest Yun-nan for about two decades and together with Ch'e-li formed the southernmost Chinese district seats in Yun-nan. The river basin is well settled by the wet-rice farming T'ai tribes, while slope farming mountain tribesmen, whose farms are seen in the white patches in the foreground, periodically shift their fields in a migratory system of agriculture, burning forests and brush for new fields as old farms become exhausted. Several states in the cycle of cultivation and abandonment are visible in this photo. It was into the Burmese Shan areas west of this region that the last remnants of the Nationalist armies under General Li Mi fled when the Communists overran China in 1949. Pocketed in such terrain as seen here, aided by local tribesmen, this force successfully withstood Burmese attacks for several years.